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It is only when a spee ch activity potentially has communicative 
inter chan ge value with someone other ·than the protected victim 
that the victim's location becomes relevant to the governme nt 's 
ability to protect her , even from nonspeech hanns. Sometimes the 
governm ent may nevertheless act to prot ect individuals from non-
speech harm s, but the magnitude of the individual interests that 
form the reason for the government's action must be weighed 
against the free speech value of the communicative interchange 
that might be restricted. The location of the victim is relevant in 
this balance only because it signals the magnitude of both the like-
lihood of communicative interchange with others and the victim's 
privacy inter est. Where the victim is in her home, the Court has 
found a greater government interest in prote cting her from intru-
sion than when she is in some other location. 157 Specifically, speech 
targeted at a home may have "a broad er communicative pur-
pose ,"158 but its location, compared to other, more publi c .ones, 
makes it less likely that the publicly communicative purpose will be 
realized and more likely that it will severely intrude on a victim who 
has "no ready means of avoiding the unwanted spee ch. ,,m 
In sum, the government has broad discretion to prot ect an indi-
vidual 's right to be left alone from nonspeech banns even when 
they result from speech occuning on a publi c street or sidewalk. 
Even where Free Speech Clause restrictions apply, physical location 
is only a signal for when a particular balan ce between competing 
constitutional interests is likely to attach. In circumstances where 
the presumption that arises from physical location does not hold 
true , constitutional principles , rath er than rigid geography, will 
pr evail. 
B. The Right to Avoid Speech Harms 
Speech harms are tho se that come from the con tent of an ex-
pression. That is, the communicative impact of the speec h activity 
inflicts a psychic wound, such as an ger , shame, resenun ent , or of-
fense. Unlike regulation to pre vent nonspe ech harm s, which may 
often raise no free speech clause question , regulation to prevent 
137. Cmnpare Frisby v. &hultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (restricting targeted residential 
picketing even though the activity may have "a broader communicative purpose"), with Mad-
sen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (stating that the clinic may protect 
its patients from the harm caused by outdoor placards by "pull(ing] its curtains" ). 
138. FrisbJ, 487 U.S. al 486. 
139. Id. at 487. 
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also not to listen.m Although one way to reconcile these conflictin g 
implications is to align them with the geographical distinction be-
tween public places and the home ,t16 simply to state the distin ction 
is not to explain it. The que stion remains , why, when there are no 
listeners other than the one who is unwilling , the home should be 
special with respect to protecting the autonomy of the individu al to 
choose not to listen, while a public forum effectively imposes an 
obligation to listen . 
A. Possible Exp!,anatum.s jc,r the Geographical Distinction 
Numerous possible explanations und erlie th e righ t to listen 's 
geographical distinction. Although they individually or toge ther 
may support a pr esumption based upon the listener 's physical loca-
tion, they do not support the current rigid geographical line. 
1. Listeners Are "C,aptive" in Their Homes Whereas They Are Capable 
of Avoiding Unwanted Speech 'When on a Public Street c,r Sidewalk-The 
scope of the free speech right implied by the Court is perhaps best 
illustrated by example. In invalidating Jesse Cantwell's breach of 
the peace conviction for playing a phon ograph record criticizing 
the Roman Catholic Church to consenting passersby on the street 
in an effort to pro selytize them , the Court noted tha t he was en-
gaged "only [in] an effort to pe rsuade a willing listener" 217 and that, 
upon being told that the speech was unwanted, "he would take the 
victrola and [go away]."218 The Court's recent statements ·about the 
scope of the free speech right in a public forum imply that Cant-
well's regard for the receptivity of his audien ce was mere 
politeness, irrelevant to the permissible scope of government re-
strictions. In fact, so long as he refrain ed from non speech condu ct 
that the government could prohibit , Cantwell had the constitu-
tional right to target individual listeners regardless of their consent, 
to ignore their requests that he cease his communications , and to 
continue to pur sue them with his victrola until they reached prop -
erty from which he could lawfully be excluded. 
These listeners do not fit the profil e of the presumptively "free " 
public forum listeners whom the Court has contrast ed to the lis-
teners "captive" in their homes. In describing th e "special benefit 
215. Seesupronote 148 and accompanying text. 
216. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 ("[T)he home is different") . 
217. c:antweU v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,310 (1940). ' 
218. Id. at 309. 
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unwanted expression where the burden of private avoidance 
threatens other free spee ch interests. n6 
Of course, another response to the plight of the pursued public 
listeners is that they will eventually reach their homes or some 
other type of pr otec ted property. The existence of an ultimate ref-
uge thus distingui shes the burden of listening to repeated 
unwanted speech in public as opposed to in the home . While this 
distinction exists between an individually targeted listener in public 
and in the hom e, there also exists the distinction between the un-
. willing public listener who can easily avoid the speech and one who 
is pursued . The fact that the former distinction exists does not ex-
plain why it is more constitutionally significant than the latter. 
Rather, as the ease of avoiding speech has been the articulated ba-
sis for including within the free speech guarantee the right to 
impose it even on listeners who are unwilling, whether the ease ex-
ists would seem to be more significant than physical location in 
determining the scope of the free speech right in situations that 
fall between the decided cases. 
2. Constitutionally Permissibl.e Conduct Restrictions Sufficiently Protect 
the Unwilling Public Listener-As noted above, the Free Speech 
Clause does not restrict the government's choice whether to pro-
tect individuals from nonspeech harm s imposed by either the 
nonspeech or speech conduct of other private individuals. m So, the 
government may choose to protect unwilling listen ers from non-
speech harms caused by speec h or conduct. In the context of an 
unwilling public listener pursu ed by a persistent speaker, these 
harms would include harassment ,228 intimidation, 229 as well as the 
harms inflicted by threats2.,o and stalking." 1 Undergirding the impli-
cation that the governme nt cannot choose to protect individuals 
from speech harms on a public street or sidewalk is the assumption 
that the government 's power to puni sh the imposition of 
226. &e, e.g .• Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., !512 U.S. 753, 772-7'!, (1993) ("The 
First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herrulean 
efforts 10 escape the cacophony of political protests."). 
227. &esuproPartIJAl-2 . 
228. SttSchenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357,385 (1997) (justifying a speech re-
sbiction based upon "previous harassment ... of patients" ). 
229. See Madstn, 512 U.S. at 774 (noting that th e government may "burden[] speech ... 
to prevent intimidation). 
230. Stt id. (stating that threats are "independently pr05Cribable"). 
231. Cf id. at 77'!>-74 (implying that a court could protect an individual from being 
• 'stalked or shadowed'• if the conduct led to duress or intimidat1on). 
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nonspeech harm s sufficiently protects the legitimate interests of 
th " lli li %32 e unwi ng stener. 
Taken at face value , this assumption as to the scope of protec-
tion that an unwilling listener may legitimately expect from the 
government appears to be an acknowledgment that , in contrast to 
a listener's protection in the hom e and in conflict with some of the 
Court 's more general articulations, a sreaker's right in a public 
place implies an obligation to listen.2' Tha t is, the nonspeech 
harms against which the Court has recogn ized that the government 
may legitimately provid e protection are exactly that-conduct 
rather than expression. "• Their definitions generally require more 
than the annoyance , offense, or psychological distress that may 
come from a gentle , but repea ted, unwant ed message and instead 
require some sort of physical obstru ction , 2,s physical hann , 2a6 or fear 
thereof.2" If indee d the Constitution imposes this limit on the 
scope of governm ent protection, then it effectively also imposes, 
through the free speech right , an obligation to listen . 
Th e oth er possible explanati on of the judicial assump tion that 
protecti on fr om nonspeech harms adequat ely addr esses the inter-
ests of the un willing listene r is that a further un acknowledged 
assumption underpins it. This assumption is that when speech 
"goes too far " and the burden on the speaker, although not rising 
to the level of obstruction , pb,ysical harm , or fear, nevertheless be-
comes in judicial judgment "severe," then the government may 
pr otect the unwilling listener through one of the nonspe ech harm 
pr ohibiti ons.2,s Protectio ns against "harassment" are parti cularly 
232. See, e.g., id. at 774 (limiting protest.en' speech as necessary to "prevent intimidation 
[or] to ensure acceS'l tO the clinic"). 
233. See supra notes 22!>-;226 and accompanying text 
234. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) (do ubting that a 
"right ... to be left alone ... accurately reflecL~ . . . First Amendment jurisprudence" and 
distinguishing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753, as "sustain[in g) an injunction designed to secure 
physical access to the clinic, but not on the basis of any generalized right 'to be left alone' on 
a publ ic street or sidewalk"). 
2:35. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 (stating th at the government may only limit speech 
activities as is necessary "to ensure access" to facilities). 
236. See, t.g., WtSConsin v. Mitchell , 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) ("[A] physical assault is n0t 
by any stretch of the imaginatio n expressive conduct protected by the F'ust Amendment."); 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 ( 1984) ("(V]iolence or other types of~ 
tend ally expr essive activities that produc e special banns distinct from their communicative 
impa ct . . . are en titled to no constitutio nal pr otection."); NAACP v. Qai bome Hardware Co., 
458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ('Th e First Amendmen t does not protect violence :"). 
237. See, e.g .• Mad.sm, 512 U.S. a t 774 (stating that the government may res trict speech 
"so infused with yjoJence as to be indistinguishable from a th reat of physical hann ") . 
238. Ste. e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Schenc k, 67 F.3d 377, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(Winter , J., concurring) (distinguishing speech to "the general public" or to a voluntary lis-
tener from ins1ances "where specific individuals ~c targeted at locations difficult or 
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susceptible to this use, and may, in practical effect, provide a scope 
of protection similar to an explicit recognition of government 
power to protect targeted unwilling listeners. !39 The problem with 
this assumption is that it leaves the scope of the unwilling public 
listener 's protection to judicial discretion, which is, in turn, con-
fined by a doctrine that defines the scope of the free speech right 
so broadly that courts must resort to fine nuances in characteriza-
tion of speaker conduct to defend their decisions to protect 
unwilling listeners. 2<1-0 
In sum, absent subterfuge or creative worclplay, conduct restric-
tions do not protect unwilling listeners from speech harms. If they 
are the sole types of protection that the government can accord to 
unwilling listeners in public places, then the Free Speech Clause 
effectively impose s an obligation to listen. 
3. In the Context of Speech Outside Abartion Clinics, the Short Dura-
tion of Unwanted Speech &plains the Obligation to Listen-Another 
possible explanation for the Court's skepticism that the govern-
ment may choose to protect a targeted listener 's right to be left 
alone on "a public street or sidewalk"m is that the further geo-
graphical qualification-that the unwilling listener be seeking 
"entrance to or exit from abortion clinics"m-is crucial to this con-
stitutional judgment. According such significance to this location 
qualification would mean that perhaps the government may choose 
to protect a targeted listener's right to avoid unwanted speech in 
other circumstances even if the listener is in a public location. 
In one sense, limiting the scope of the obligation to listen in this 
way can indeed help justify it. The most obvious distinction be-
tween. persistent speech outside an abortion facility and speech in 
other publi c locations is spacial and temporal. Even pursuit in this 
inconvenient for them to avoid, [where) the First Amendment's tolerance of plausibly coer-
cive or obstructionist protest is least" (emphas is added) (citation omitted)). 
239. See, e.g., id. at 396 (Wmter,J., concurring) (finding "no right to invade the personal 
space of individuals going about lawful business. to dog their footsteps or chase them do"11 a 
street, to scream or gesticulate in their faces, or to do anything else that cannot be fairly de-
scribed as an attempt at peaceful persuasion"); see also Sdimck, 519 U.S. at 381 n .11 
·(upholding a "cease and desist" provision based on the conclusion that it was a legitimate 
effort to "accommodate" the speakers' rights when "the District Court was entitle d to con-
clude ... that the only feasible way to shield individuals ... from unprotected conduct ... 
would ha,oe been to keep the entire area clear of defendant protesters."). 
24-0. ~ e.g., Prr;C/ioiu Netwcrll, 67 F.3d at 391-92 ("The purpose of [the 'cease and de-
sist') provision is not ... to suppress speech .because of the anxiety iis content produces in its 
audience, but rather to pro~ide a vulnerab le group of medical patients with some relief from 
the duress caused by unwelcome physical proximity to an extreme ly vocal group of demon -
strators." (citation omitl.ed) ). 
241. Schmck, 519 U.S, at 383. 
242. Id.. at 386 (Scalia.]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
530 University of Muhigan Journal of Law Reform (VOL. 32:3 
circumstance must take place within limited geographical bounda-
ries and thus a limited time frame. These limitations, in turn, can 
be seen to translate into limitations on the speech harms that may 
be imposed on the unwilling listener. 243 These limitations may 
therefore support a per se judgment that, when they apply, the 
unwilling listener's burden will never outweigh the speaker's free 
speech right and so there is_no right to be left alone within these 
boundarie s. 
But this type of line drawing is arbitrary in a number of respects. 
First, like the other possible explanations, it does riot explain why a 
targeted unwilling listener receives different protection outside an 
abortion clinic than inside the home . Second, while potentially lim-
iting the scope of an obligation to listen to unwanted speech, it fails 
to explain what variables might change the speaker /lis tener bal-
ance in other situations. In particular , it fails to explain where or 
when, after an initial rebuff by a listener, the government may re-
strict a speaker's continuing efforts of persuasion. Is two city blocks 
too long a pursuit? Or, does ten minutes of peaceful but persistent 
targeted speech become too long? Or two hours ? Or two days? By 
failing to provide guidance as to these issues, the Court ensures 
that a limitation of the obligation to listen in the area outside abor-
tion clinics will become arbitrary in application as different 
government actors reach different conclusions about the permissi-
ble scope of protection of unwilling listeners in other physical 
location s. 
For all of these reasons, a limitation of the implied obligation to 
listen in the abortion .protest contex t, while perhaps attractive in 
the short run, only compounds th e doctrinal confusion because it 
fails to relate the relevancy of physical location to underlying Free 
Speech Clause values. 
4. Allowing No Right to Be Left Alone in a Public Forum Is Necessary 
to Ensure That Publicly Directed spee~h Is Fully .Protected-According to 
243. But s«, e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1427 
(W.D.N.Y. 1992), ajf'd .rub nom. Pro.Q10ice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d !59 (2d Cir. 1994), 
vacated in pan on reh'g en bane, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Or. 1995), rev'd in pari and afl'd in part, 519 
U.S. 357 (1997). The court noted the following: 
[T]he risks associated with an abortion increase if the patient suffers from additional 
streM and anxiety [caused by abortion protest activities]. Increased stress and anxiety 
can cause patients to : {l) have elevated blood pressure; (2) hyperventilate; (3) require 
sedation; or ( 4) require special coun,eling and attention before they are able lo ob-
tain health care. Patients may become so agitated that they are unable to lie sti.11 in the 
operating room thereby increasing !he risks associated with surgery. 
Id. at 1427. 
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In practical application, these related concepts of individual 
autonomy and willingness have led to a permissible range of gov· 
ern men t actions to protect individuals in their home s. Specifically, 
the Court has accepted the government purpos e to protect the in-
dividual autonomy interest in "willing" comm unicative interactions 
as a constitutional value that can justify what might otherwise ap-
pear to be an un constitutional speech restriction .258 
As noted earlier, the scope of the autonomy protection around 
the hom e is broad. The Court has uph eld, in its efforts to prot ect 
the "willingness" of the acts of listening, government actions that 
enfor ce individual decisions to reject further communications from 
particular speakers after receipt and review of a first communica-
tion;2;g that enforce individual decisions not to receive broad types 
of communications without any initial contact with the message/00 
.and that prohibit certain types of communications from entering 
the home without an individual rejection based on the assumption 
that they are so likely to be unwanted. ~1 As demonstrated above,262 
explanation s that relate to pres erving the possibility of communica-
tive in terchange, as it has thu s far been articulated by the Court, do 
not justify the line that the Court has seemed to draw between 
permissible government efforts to protect listener autonomy in 
public places and in the home. The failure of these explanations 
suggests that if willing interchange is indeed the Free Speech 
Clause 's focus, then the scope of prot ection for the individual ly 
targeted listener should apply equally in public as well as in the 
home. 
Pot ential applications of this conclusion, however, draw it into 
que stion. Specifically, in addition to validating government actions 
such as "cease and desist" provisions,268 the translation of home rules 
into publi c places would validate government actions to enforce , for 
258. See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("[I]n t.he privacy oft.he 
home ... the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendm ent rights 
ofan tntruder." (citing Rowan, 397 U.S. at 734; id. at 890. 
259. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 734 (upholding a statute that gave the mail addressee 
"complete and unfettered discretion in electing wbether or not he desired to receive furth er 
material from a particular sender") . 
260. Se.e Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) ("A city can punish tho5C 
who call at a home in defiance of the pfe\,iously expressed will of the occupant .... "). 
261. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) ("Because t.he [targeted] picketing . .. 
is speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to receive it, the State 
has a substantial and justifiable interest in banning it."). 
262. See supro Part IV A · 
263. This would be t.he analog to a government action enforcing an individual's decision 
not to receive further mail from a partic ular sende r. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 734. 
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decision to reject speech with the homeowner where it belongs.286 
Government enforcement of a hom eowner 's decision to reject 
communicati ons endorsing Democratic political candidates or ad-
vocating gun control, however, seems less compatible with free 
speech values. Although both types of governm ent action simply 
enforce individual homeowne rs' decisions to reject unwanted 
communications targeted at them only, the latter uses government 
power to suppre ss speech because of its content, 287 which repre-
sents the quinte ssential Free Speech Clause danger. 1188 Yet if a 
homeown er has a special righ t to avoid speech harms, then this 
means of discriminating among them should not matt er. 
Examination of the scope of the special status of the home, and 
the ideal scope of the protection of the possibility of communi ca-
tive interchang e reveals why this content discrimination, even in 
the hom e, poses a copstitutional danger. Th e home has a special 
status in constitutional doctrine as an individual 's one refuge from 
otherwise completely pervasive majoritarian ·action. 289 As noted 
above.290 this justification for its unique treatment does not exten d 
to government efforts to prot ect unwilling listeners in the home 
from private speakers. Th ese efforts put the weight of majoritarian 
action on the side of the hom e-dweller restricting the free flow of 
communication. Thus , the reasons that supp ort special treatment 
of the home in other contex ts do not support the distinction with 
respect to government action protecting unwilling listeners from 
spee ch harm s. 
Because a government action protecting an unwilling listener in 
the home is a majoritarian action restricting the possibility of 
communicativ e interchang e beyond the ideal balan ce of speech 
flow and autono my interests, its speech justification should bear 
the same weight regardl ess of the listener's physical location. Al-
though this conclusion would seem to dictat e the same treatment 
of unwilling listeners regardless of physical location as a matter of 
theory, other protections unique to the home dictate a broader 
range of permissible government protection in practice. 
286. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 149. 
287. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (defining a speech resui ction as content · 
based if its justification focuses on "the direct impact that speech has on its listeners") . 
288. Stt R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content -based regulations · 
are presumptively invalid."). 
289. Stt Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("Our prior decisions have often re-
marked on the unique nature of the home ... and have recognized Lhat '[ p]reserving the 
sanc tity of the home, the one retreat 10 which men and women can repair to escape from the 
uibulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value." (quoting Carcyv. Brown, 447 
U.S. 455,471 (1980))). 
290. See supra Part IIl.B.2. 
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balanc e obtain regardle ss of the listene r 's physical location, the 
overlap in, practi ce of nonspeech autonomy interests with speech-
related autonomy interests means that unwilling listeners may r~ 
ceive greater protection in the home. Recogn ition of this practical 
effect could lead to restricting th e permissible scope of government 
protection of the unwilling listener in the public sphere to com-
pen sate for the greate r protection at home. Again , however, it is 
not nec essary to distort the theo retical ideal to recognize that over-
lapping spe ech in terests in the public sphere may effectively lead to 
speake r protections beyond the ideal balance in the same way that 
the opposite effect occurs in the hom e. 
Free Speech Clause doctrine appropriately prote cts communica-
tions deemed unwant ed by some, or even most, listeners when they 
are plau sibly also directed at listen ers who have not rejected them. 
Circumstances make it more difficult to isolate solely individually 
dir ected commun ications in public places than in the home. The 
communicative inter change value dictates that the presump tion, 
when th e directi on of speech is ambiguous , sho uld be that it is pulr 
licly as well as individually directed. Given this pr esumption , an 
individual rejection will not be ,enough to supp ort government ac-
tion to pr otec t the unwilling listener. Only ,~hen it is clear that a 
listener has received and rejected a targeted comm unic ation , will 
the ideal balan ce apply. 
Despite the fact that it may be more difficult to isolate instances 
of solely individuall y directed communi cations in the public 
sphere , it is not imp ossible to do so. Sidewalk counselo rs commu-
nicating with individual clinic patients in fact present an example 
of a segregable instance of solely individually directed communica-
tion. That the presumpti on in the face of ambiguity is that the 
speech is both publi cly and individuall y directed should not cause 
the Court to ignore the appr opri ate ideal balance when the ambi-
guity doe s not obtain. 
c. Conclusion- Th at the ho.me is a refuge from the cacophony of 
the public sphe re will prot ect most listeners in their homes from 
unwant ed communi cations targeted solely at them . Similarly, the 
principle that public places must rema in open for even outrageous 
communications wilJ protect most speake rs in most public places 
from government efforts to sup pre ss their speech to serve the 
autonomy inte rests of unwilling listene rs. Both of these rules , how-
ever, repre sent presumptive balan ces of constitutional interests and 
pra ctical circumstances. These underlying values, rather than rigid 
geographical distinction s, must form the most fundam ental guide 
to det .ermi ning the validity of any parti cular government action. So, 
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for example, when a homedweller seeks to exclude speech solely 
because of its message, the ideal "one bite" requirement should 
limit the government's ability to protect the unwilling listener re-
gardless of her location in a hom e. So, too, where the int erests 
presented in a public place exactly duplicate the inter ests in the 
home that the Court has balanced in favor of allowing the govern-
ment to protect an unwilling speaker, then the constitutional 
balance, rather than the rigid rule of physical location , should de-
termine the validity of the government action. 
CONCLUS ION 
With respect to pro tection of an unwilling listener from speech 
harms, the home should not be special. Rather, a balance between 
the free spe ech value of preserving the possibility of commun icative 
interchange and the listener's autonomy interest in rejecting re-
peated unwanted communications should determine the validity of 
a governme nt action to prot ect an unwilling listener. In pra ctical · 
effect, such government actions will be more likely valid with re-
spect to listeners in the home than with respect to publicly located 
listeners. This difference, however , does not relate to the doctrinal 
ideal, which is that a speaker get "one bite" of an individually tar-
geted prospective listener, after which the government may enforce 
the listener 's decision to reject further communications. Rather, 
the apparently different treaunent of speakers and listeners accord-
ing to their physical locations relates to the , pra ctical difficulties of 
isolating situations that fit the constitutional ideal. In the home, 
other legitimate interests weigh in favor of the listener, and so in 
ambiguous situations, listener intere sts may prevail. Similarly, in 
public places, speaker intere sts with respect to listeners othe r than 
the one seeking protection weigh in favor of the speaker, render-
ing government efforts to protect one listener invalid when others 
are present. In both instances, however, the sameconstitutional ideal 
should remain the ultimate guidepost-;>reserving a possibility of 
communicativ e interaction that include s regard for an individual 's 
self-conscious decision to rejec t unwanted communications. 
